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The paper develops a growth model of multiple equilibria. In
the model, poverty trap is caused by the presence of negative
externalities  side e¤ects during an economys take o¤. The
role of growth-maximizing public investment in this economy is
more decisive than in ergodic ones. Depending on the economys
initial condition, even a temporary policy shock may bring a per-
manent growth miracle, particularly, if the shock is not too weak
or followed by a negative o¤setting/counterbalancing one.
1 Introduction
In traditional economic growth models, e¢ cient practices predict e¢ -
cient outcomes.1 In a perfectly competitive economy, agents make per-
fectly rational decisions that unanimously lead to unique, high-income
equilibrium outputs. However, a snapshot of the real world provides a
di¤erent picture: the fact is that both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient economies
coexist. Theoretically, deviations from the neoclassical benchmark could
generate ine¢ cient outcomes along with e¢ cient ones. A number of pa-
pers, for instance, show that multiple equilibria are likely to rise when
fertility is endogenous,2 technologies are non-convex,3 income inequality
prevails and/or the capital market is imperfect,4 etc.5
1Classic examples are Solow (1956), Romer (1986), and Lucas (1988).
2Becker et al. (1990).
3Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
4Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997).
5See also Galor (1996), Azariadis (1996), and Azariadis (2006) for more models
with multiple equilibria with subsistence consumption, impatient government, in-
complete market, monopolistic competition in product or factor market, augmented
human capital, externalities, and income distribution.
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This paper presents other possibilities that could cause multiple equi-
libria, along with a qualitative analysis (using phase-diagrams) of the
role of growth-maximizing public investment in poverty trap which are
rarely addressed in the literature.6 The study shows analytically how a
poverty trap could arise due to side e¤ects related to ongoing economic
progress, and examines the role of growth-maximizing public investment
in evading it.
It is well acknowledged while economic development has tremendous
benets (e.g., improved health and education quality), it also has down-
sides (e.g., a temporary increase in income inequality, pollution, skilled
migration, and lower social cohesion).7 Some of these phenomena may
seriously damage further economic progress. For instance, a temporary
increase in brain drain (skilled migration) during an economys take-
o¤ could potentially cause poverty trap, and the literature provides no
reason why it should not. Sometimes referred as "migration humps,
or temporary increases in emigration during a countrys economic take-
o¤,"8 this is both a notable and a theoretically and empirically supported
phenomenon that is detrimental to economic growth.
We have thus developed a model that shows economic development
not only as a source of positive learning-by-doing externality that en-
hances further productivity, but also as a source of negative externality
that discourages it. In the model, therefore, production takes place in
an environment where learning-by-doing externality prevails, in line with
Arrow (1962), Frankel (1962), and Romer (1986), which complements in-
dividual production and hence promotes endogenous growth. However,
along with this learning-by-doing externality, a negative development-
related externality also exists, which deters individual and aggregate pro-
ductivity. The development-related problem is a temporary phenomenon
particularly assumed to arise at the initial stage of economic growth, and
then decline. We focus on a particular instance of "migration hump"
type brain drain as the development-related problem.
In the model, individuals accumulate human capital via private and
public inputs while using it for goods production. Production of nal
goods takes place using Newman and Reads (1961) production function.
This is a generalized Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function, but for
a certain value of its parameter it contains the popular CD function. It
6Galor and Tsiddon (1997) have done qualitative analysis (using phase-diagrams)
on technologys e¤ect on poverty trap. Azariadis (2006, p. 32-34) presents an informal
discussion of the role of public policy in economies characterized by multiple equilibria
and poverty trap.
7See, e.g., Kuznets (1955) for a temporary increase in income inequality during
an economys take-o¤.
8Martin and Taylor (1996, p. 45).
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is less restrained on technologies; specically, it is a variable elasticity
of substitution (VES) production function rather than a standard CD
production function. We use certain parameters of the Newman-Read
production function to denote the development-related problem, in par-
ticular the "migration hump" e¤ect.
The dynamics of the economy described above, for a range of para-
meters, yields a multiplicity of growth paths with possibilities that the
economy could converge to a low or high equilibrium depending on ini-
tial human capital wealth. In the model, economies that start out below
a certain critical value of initial economic development (or initial human
capital wealth) may converge to the low-income equilibrium (poverty
trap). However, they could monotonically converge to the high-income
equilibrium if their initial human capital wealth is beyond the threshold
value. The multiplicity of growth paths is mostly related to changes in
technological states. The hump-shaped brain drain "interchanges" in-
creasing for decreasing returns to social input (aggregate human capital),
which gives the production function a convex and concave curvature at
the bottom and upper part respectively.9
This paper analyzes the role of growth-maximizing public investment
in the poverty trap model. Although policy may not necessarily enable a
country to evade poverty trap, its role in the economy described above is
important.10 In the model, a policy shock changes the threshold value of
the poverty trap. But whether the change enables the economy to evade
the trap depends on other exogenous factors, such as the history and
technology of the country at stake. In general, the e¤ect of public policy
in evading poverty trap is undecided in the model. (1) On the one hand,
a policy shock could result in a growth miracle. Optimal (in terms of
growth-maximizing) public investment may create a growth miracle by
increasing the human capital stock from slightly below to slightly above
the critical threshold value that determines the long-run growth path
of the economy. It could even abolish the poverty trap and thus create
an opportunity for the economy to move to a unique and globally stable
high-income steady state equilibrium.11 (2) Alternatively, a policy shock
could change the critical value, but not enough to evade the poverty trap.
In other words, the change may not leave the country above the threshold
value, and hence the economy will inevitably converge to a low-income
9See Azariadis and Drazen (1990) for more information on how interchanging
increasing to decreasing returns to a social input could result in multiple equilibria.
10Azariadis (2006, p. 32-34) argues informally that policy and history matter much
more in an environment with poverty trap than they do in one without, such as that
is found in a traditional ergodic growth model.
11See Galor and Tsiddon (1997) for a similar e¤ect of technology on poverty trap.
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steady state equilibrium.
The proposition that brain drain could cause poverty trap is based
upon two main premises that are largely supported by empirical evi-
dence. The rst is that there is a nonlinear relationship between mi-
gration and economic development. That is, economic development is
one of the fundamental, driving forces of out-migration that rises at
the initial stage of economic growth and then declines (see, e.g., Martin
and Taylor 1996; Hatton and Williamson 2005; Chiswick et al. 2003).12
Martin and Taylor (1996) state that migration humps, or temporary in-
creases in emigration during a countrys economic growth, are not new
phenomena. Rather, they argue, migration humps have existed from the
19th century (Europes period of industrialization) to the modern days
of East Asian countriesgrowth miracles.13
It is largely believed that skilled migration constitutes the lions share
of total migration from developing to developed countries, particularly in
recent times. According to Adams (2003), the vast majority of migrants
from developing countries to the United States and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have a secondary or
higher education. Hatton and Williamson (2006, p.328-329) calculated
that the ratio of highly educated emigrants to total emigrants from poor
nations to the OECD in 1990 averaged more than 14 to 1. Mishra
(2007) found that many Caribbean countries have lost more than 70%
of their skilled labor forces (12 years plus) due to emigration to the
OECD. Docquier et al. (2007) state that, "Between 1990 and 2000, the
stock of skilled immigrants in OECD countries increased by 64 percent.
The rise was stronger for immigrants from developing countries (up 93
percent), especially from Africa (up 113 percent), Latin America and the
Caribbean (up 97 percent)." Collier et al. (2004) documented that the
last decades "hemorrhage" of African human capital is accelerating.14
The authors argued that Africas nancial capital ight (which, up to
the late 1980s, reversed the human capital ight) is the new challenge
in Africas post-independence history.15
12See Ziesemer (2008) for a detailed survey of the literature on migration humps.
13The most common reasons mentioned in the literature as to why migration humps
exist are "supply-push emigration" (Martin and Taylor 1996) and an increase in
peoples capabilities and aspirations during economic development (de Haas 2007).
14See also Fosu et al. (2004) for a discussion on Africas challenge with respect to
the ight of its human and other capital ight .
15Africa also experienced high growth rate in the 1990s. Ndulu et al. (2007) noted:
"Since 1995, more than one-third of the countries in SSA are growing at average rates
exceeding 5 percent annually. Several others have shown themselves to be capable of
short spurts of high growth. The challenge for them is how to sustain such a pace
for longer periods."
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The second premise is that brain drain could be detrimental to the
economy of either the home or the destination country. It could nega-
tively a¤ect the quantity and quality of human capital of those remaining
at home, which, in turn, could hurt the economic growth of the home
country. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), in one of the earliest contribu-
tions on this topic, argued that the drain of highly skilled individuals is
a loss to those left behind, and has negative implications for the income
and welfare of the destination country. The negative impact of brain
drain on the home country has also been emphasized in recent endoge-
nous growth literature (Miyagiwa 1991; Haque and Kim 1995; Galor and
Tsiddon 1997; Wong and Yip 1999; Beine et al. 2001). Wong and Yip
(1999) argue that brain drain damages both the nonemigrants and the
source countrys economic growth. Haque and Kim (1995) developed
a two-country endogenous growth model and showed that brain drain
negatively a¤ects the growth rate of the e¤ective human capital of the
emigrantscountry and hence reduces its economic growth.
Recently, some studies have turned the issue of brain drain into brain
gain by searching for some compensatory e¤ect such as remittances, re-
turn migrations, or enhanced human capital accumulation. The main
rationale of the latter is that when education is privately and endoge-
nously determined, the possibility of migrating to a higher-wage country
increases the average rate of return in the home country, which in turn
increases domestic individual investment in human capital accumulation
(Mountford 1997; Stark et al. 1998; Beine et al. 2001). However, the fact
that much of the educational investment in developing countries is un-
dertaken by the state (Fosu 2007) could undermine this compensatory
e¤ect. Moreover, some argue that the high probability of emigration
could lead individuals to "under-invest" in education. Lien and Wang
(2005) developed a model showing that when individuals choose educa-
tion and language before migration, they can invest less in their human
capital, depending on the substitution e¤ect between language and ed-
ucation. "The result is a less educated, Americanizedpopulation with
better language skills and lower human capital" (Lien and Wang 2005,
p. 154).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model,
while Section 3 discusses the dynamics of aggregate variables, multiple
equilibria and poverty trap. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ect of optimal
productive public investment in poverty trap. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Preferences and Technologies
Suppose we have a continuum of homogeneous households, i 2 [0; 1],
with overlapping generations. Each household i consists of an adult of
generation t and a child of generation t + 1. The population size is
thus constant and normalized to be one. Let, at the beginning, each
household i of the initial generation be endowed with an initial human
capital h0.
When young, individuals accumulate human capital using both pri-
vate and public input in a standard CD production technology. As
adults, they use their accumulated human capital for nal goods pro-
duction. The government taxes income using a at rate tax  in order
to nance the public input, denoted by Gt, which is used to complement
the accumulation of human capital.16 During their active period, indi-
viduals allocate after-tax income between current consumption ct and
saving et to use for their childrens education. The latter is incorporated
in individualsutility function as the "joy of giving." Therefore, altruis-
tic individuals derive utility from consumption and giving, i.e., investing
in the human capital of their o¤spring ht+1.
The utility of an individual is thus dened as
ut (ct; et)  ln ct +  ln et (1)
subject to
ct + et = (1   )yt (2)
where yt represents the individuals income.
As previously mentioned, the human capital accumulation function
of the o¤spring ht+1 is a function of public investment Gt and parental
investment et. The accumulation function takes the standard CD form,
with constant returns to scale in factors. Thus, for an individual born
at time t, the human capital at t+ 1 is given by
ht+1 = A (Gt)
1  (et)
 +  (3)
where  > 0 is a parameter that assures ht+1 6= 0 even if parental
investment on education is et = 0.
The government levies a at-rate tax  on output Yt, which is used
to nance public investment. The government budget is balanced at all
times as
16Note that in this paper, lower- and uppercase letters are used to denote individual
and aggregate/average variables, respectively.
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Gt =  Yt (4)
where Gt and Yt represent public investment and aggregate income, re-
spectively.
According to the above descriptions, an adult of period t solves the
following problem, which is derived by substituting (2) into (1),
Max
et
ln ((1   )yt   et) +  ln et (5)
taking as given  and Gt.
The rst-order condition gives
et = a(1   )yt (6)
where a = 
1+
. Equation (6) shows an individuals saving as a fraction
of her after-tax income.
2.2 Goods Production
There are innite numbers of competitive small rms owned by house-
holds. We suppose that production at rm level occurs using both pri-
vate and social inputs in a Newman and Read (1961) production setting.
At time t, output yt is produced using individual and aggregate human
capital inputs, denoted by ht and Ht respectively. However, we model
the latter to reect positive learning-by-doing spillover, in line with Ar-
row (1962), Frankel (1962), and Romer (1986), along with a negative
development-induced externality.
The Newman and Read (1961) production function is employed to
capture these phenomena together. This is a generalized CD production
function that contains the popular CD production function for a certain
value of its parameter. It is less restrained in technologies in that it is
a VES production function with a variable-factors income share. Al-
though its use is relatively rare in the literature of economic growth, the
Newman-Read production function o¤ers a powerful analytical frame-
work for economic development studies. In addition to its suitability for
modeling a negative development-induced spillover (e.g., a temporary
increase in skilled migration) along with a positive one (e.g., learning by
doing), unlike the CD and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
production functions, it is more suitable for income distribution studies17
17Getachew (2008) argued that the standard production functions such as CD and
CES lack either exibility in parameters or analytical tractability with regard to
income distribution studies. However, the Newman-Read generalized CD function is
both exible in the values of the parameters and analytically tractable with respect to
distribution studies. Getachew (2008) applied the Newman-Read production function
in analyzing the e¤ect of public capital on income inequality dynamics.
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and gives a better approximation of the reality of the short-run behavior
of factor shares.18
Thus, the income of an agent of generation t, in the Newman-Read
production function, is dened as
yt = (ht)
 (Ht)
 exp ( (Ht) lnHt lnht) (7)
where yt and ht represent individual output and human capital, re-
spectively; Ht is aggregate human capital, which is dened as Ht R 1
0
ht (ht), where  (ht) is the distribution of wealth at time t. We as-
sume:
Ht> 0; ht > 0 (A.1)
(Ht)> 1 (A.2)
The exponential term  (Ht) lnHt  0 in the Newman-Read func-
tion may represent, in general, the negative externalities that may arise
in a countrys economy (such as skilled "migration hump") during the
economys takeo¤.19 (Ht), which is a xed parameter (or simply ) in
the original Newman-Read function, is assumed here to be a function of
aggregate human capital.
We use (Ht) lnHt as a function of aggregate human capital to dic-
tate a skilled migration hump, or a nonlinear relationship between brain
drain and economic development, as the latter is denoted by an increase
in Ht. Therefore, we shall assume (Ht) lnHt to rise at the initial stage
of economic development and then to decline as shown in Figure 1. 20
18Empirical studies reveal that factor shares show large short-run uctuations,
but no long-run trend (e.g. Acemoglu 2003). The Newman-Read generalized CD
production function contains a framework that provides a satisfactory approximation
to this reality, particularly in contrast to the popular CD function. The latter imposes
strict restrictions on relative factor share and on the elasticity of substitution between
factors. In particular, the factor shares are constant and the factors elasticity of
substitution is equal to unity.
19This negative externality can be easily understood as quality and quantity reduc-
tions in e¤ective human capital due to brain drain. For instance, if a home country
produces human capital Ht, then we may dene the e¤ective human capital, after
brain drain takes place, Ht  Ht exp( (Ht)), where Ht and (Ht) > 0 denote the
e¤ective human capital and the rate of brain drain. If we substitute this in a simple
CD production function such as yt = (ht)

(Ht)
 , then we get a production function
similar to (7), yt = exp( (Ht)) (ht) (Ht) .
20Note that migration hump is treated here in an exogenous manner. That is, the
hump shape attributed to (Ht) lnHt is an assumption based on an observation that




Figure 1: A negative development-induced externality.
We further assume that the production function in (7) exhibits di-
minishing (increasing) returns to scale with respect to individual (total)
input(s):
0 < ;  < 1, but +  > 1 (A.3)
2.3 Properties of Individual and Aggregate Pro-
duction Function
As noted above, the production function used here is of a Newman and
Read (1961) form. For certain values of its parameters, the Newman-
Read production function satises the standard properties of production
functions. As Solow (1957) noted, a particular functional form adopted
for a production function is a matter of no great consequence as far as
it possesses a positive partial derivative and the right curvature.
The rst and the second derivative of the production function in (7)












2 (  (Ht) lnHt   1) (  (Ht) lnHt) < 0
assuming21
21Newman and Read (1961) show that their production function obeys neoclassical
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 > (Ht) lnHt;  > (Ht) lnHt (A.4)
Therefore, at an individual level, and with respect to private fac-
tor human capital, the Newman-Read production function obeys the
neoclassical rule in that it has a positive marginal productivity and a
concave curvature.
In characterizing the properties of individual and aggregate produc-
tion functions with respect to the social human capital Ht, we assume
that the elasticity of the brain drain parameter (Ht) to aggregate hu-
man capital Ht is su¢ ciently small, in a well-dened sense,





   (Ht) lnHt
(Ht) lnHt lnht
(A.5)
where (Ht) denotes the elasticity of (Ht) to Ht.
We establish the following two Lemmas to characterize the properties
of individual and aggregate production functions with respect to the
social human capital Ht.
Lemma 1 Assumption (A.5) provides su¢ cient condition for an in-
dividual production function to have a positive marginal productivity,
@yt
@Ht
> 0, with respect to the social input Ht.






[  Ht0(Ht) lnHt lnht   (Ht) lnht]




0(Ht) lnHt lnht + (Ht) lnht






   (Ht) lnHt
(Ht) lnHt lnht
Aggregate income is simply derived by aggregating (7),22




exp ( (Ht) lnht lnHt) = (ht) (Ht) lnHt . To see this, let
x = (ht)

exp ( (Ht) lnht lnHt). Then, lnx = ln (ht)   (Ht) lnHt lnht =














Therefore, equation (8) denotes aggregate production function in the
economy. The following Lemma characterizes its property with respect
to the social human capital Ht.
Lemma 2 Assumptions (A.4) and (A.5) provide su¢ cient conditions
for the aggregate production function (8) to have a positive marginal
productivity with respect to its factor input Ht, or @Yt@Ht > 0.







+    2(Ht) lnHt  Ht0(Ht) ln2Ht

Then, su¢ cient condition for @Yt
@Ht
> 0 is
+  > Ht
0(Ht) ln
2Ht + 2(Ht) lnHt
But, from (A.4) and Lemma 1, we have  > (Ht) lnHt and  >
Ht
0(Ht) ln
2Ht + (Ht) lnHt, respectively.
The second derivative of the individual and aggregate production
function might be positive or negative. In fact, at this point, devia-
tion from the neoclassical benchmark is required to generate multiple
equilibria and hence poverty trap.
3 Dynamics, Multiple Equilibria, and Poverty Traps
3.1 Dynamics of Individual and Aggregate Human
Capital
In this section we characterize the dynamics of the economy described
in previous section. We derive aggregate human capital dynamics us-
ing the individual and aggregate production functions, and determine
whether multiple equilibria and poverty trap exist. But before we start
dealing with aggregate variables, we must rst derive individualscap-
ital accumulation function that is related to their optimal behavior by
substituting (4) and (6) into (3), and using (7) and (8),23
23See Appendix A for details on the derivation.
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ht+1=A 
 (a(1   ))1  (Ht)(+ (Ht) lnHt)+(1 ) (ht)(1 )
exp (( (Ht) lnht lnHt) (1  )) +  (9)
Thus, equation (9) shows an individuals human capital accumula-
tion function, which is associated to her optimal behavior. We simply








  A ( ) (a(1   ))1  (100)
Equation (10) thus determines the dynamics of the economy, which
we characterize in detail below.
3.2 Multiple Equilibria and Poverty Trap
The dynamics of (10) are characterized by the existence of multiple equi-
libria. For a range of parameters, equation (10) yields multiple growth
paths that lead to three steady states, of which two are stable and one is
unstable. Of the stable steady states, one is characterized by low-income
equilibrium (or poverty trap); the other by high-income equilibrium.
In characterizing (10) and showing the existence of multiple equilib-
ria, we follow Galor and Tsiddon (1997). We thus take the rst derivative





+ (Ht) lnHt 1  +    2(Ht) lnHt  Ht0(Ht) ln2Ht
(11)
Following the Lemmas, we dene the term in the big bracket of equation
(11) as
+    2(Ht) lnHt  Ht0(Ht) ln2Ht 2 (0;1) (12)
We make the following two additional assumptions which are related
to a negative development-related externality:
lim
Ht!0
+    (Ht) lnHt > 1 (A.6)
lim
Ht!1
+    (Ht) lnHt < 1 (A.7)
24See Appendix B for details on the derivation.
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Then, together with earlier assumptions (A.1)(A.5) and hence (12),
(A.6) and (A.7) assure that equation (10) becomes a well-behaved non-
convex function. (A.6) in particular creates increasing returns to scale
at a lower level of human capital related to the existence of low-income
equilibrium, whereas (A.7) assures the existence of a high-income steady
state equilibrium rather than a divergence one: lim
Ht!1
Ht+1 = H. The
following proposition summarizes the existence of multiple equilibria and
hence poverty trap, in the economy described in equation (10).
Proposition 3 Given assumptions (A.1)(A.7), (12), and  > 0, the
economy described in (10) is characterized by multiple steady-state equi-









3. Ht+1 > Ht for some values of Ht.
Proof. It follows from the continuity of (10), Figure 2, assumptions
(A.1)(A.7) and the intermediate value theorem (see also Galor and
Tsiddon 1997, section 2.5). Equation (10) is continuous at Ht by de-
nition. Therefore, from the intermediate value theorem, the third con-
dition is satised. The rst and second conditions are satised from
assumptions (A.6), (A.7) and equation (12).
Together a su¢ ciently small , the rst condition assures the exis-
tence of a low-income equilibrium, as shown in Figure 2, H1. The second
condition, together with the third, assures the existence of a high-income
equilibrium (also shown in Figure 2, H3).
Thus, Figure 2 shows multiple equilibria, with three steady states
for a given level of 
. There is a low-income stable steady state H1, a
threshold unstable steady state H2 and a high-income stable steady state
equilibrium H3. The second steady state equilibrium, H2 2 (H1; H3),
creates a critical point for the low- and high-income steady state equi-
libria to be realized. The low steady state equilibrium H1 is similar to
what the literature refers to as a "poverty trap." For a given range of
technological parameters, both the low and high steady states H1 and
H3, respectively, are self-reinforcing. Given a technological level 
, an
initial human capital H0 smaller (greater) than the threshold level hu-
man capital H2 converges to the low steady state H1(high-income steady






Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria and Poverty Trap
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4 Public Investment and Threshold Externality
4.1 Does Public PolicyMatter for Long Run Growth?
Is there any role for public policy in this economy? Does growth-
maximizing public investment in this economy lead a country to evade
the poverty trap? Growth-maximizing public investment in this econ-
omy is the tax-rate level that maximizes the technological parameter 

shown in equation (10), where 
 is dened in (100).25 The tax rate that
maximizes 




= 0)   =  (13)
where   denotes the growth-maximizing tax-rate. In this economy, a
policy shock has an e¤ect on the threshold point. Even a temporary
policy shock may bring permanent consequences.
In general, two di¤erent possibilities are presented in relation to a
change in public policy towards growth-maximizing level of public in-
vestment. First, such policy change in an economy described in equa-
tion (10) may abolish the poverty trap and thus create an opportunity
for the economy to move to a unique and globally stable high-income
steady state equilibrium as shown in Figure 3.26 The gure illustrates
a possible e¤ect of a policy shock via a change in tax rate from a sub-
optimal to growth-maximizing level of public investment, denoted by
 s and   respectively, where the curves associated with the subopti-




) respectively. The shock moves the curve dened in (10) up-
ward in the direction of the arrow. As a result, the economy changes
from a non-ergodic economy with multiple steady states to an ergodic
one with a unique steady state. The shock not only ensures that the
economy evades a poverty trap but also creates a new, higher equilib-
rium point (compare Hs3 and H

3 ).
Second, a policy shock (a change in public policy towards growth-
maximizing level of public investment) in an economy described in (10)
may change the threshold value, but whether this change leads the econ-
omy out of the poverty trap depends on other factors, such as initial
income/capital of the economy at stake. If the economys initial capital
is situated near enough to the threshold value, the policy shock may cre-
ate a growth miracle by increasing the capital stock from slightly below
25Recall that 
 constitutes both exogenous technological and public investment
parameters.




















Figure 4: A policy shock that does not necessarily generate a growth
miracle
to slightly above the threshold value. However, if the initial income is
su¢ ciently lower than the threshold value, the policy change may not
lead the country to evade poverty trap. Figure 4 shows that a policy
shock moves the curve in equation (10) upward. However, this time the
shock brings the desired growth miracle conditionally. That is, the mir-
acle may happen only if the initial human capital stock H0 is located
in between the new and the old threshold levels, i.e., H0 2 (Hs2 ; H2 ).
However, if the initial human capital is su¢ ciently low (smaller than
H2 ), for instance if it is located at H
0
0, then the economy converges to a
low-income steady state equilibrium despite the policy shock.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a model showing economic development not only
as a source of positive learning-by-doing externality that has enhanced
further productivity, but also as a source of negative externality that
has discouraged it. The presence of negative externalities (e.g., skilled
"migration humps" or temporary increases in brain drain during an econ-
omys takeo¤) can result in a poverty trap. In the model, a change in
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public policy towards growth-maximizing level of public investment was
found to be crucial but indeterminate with respect to poverty trap. De-
pending on some initial conditions, however, such policy shock could
create a threshold externality that leads economies to evade poverty
trap.
A Individual Human Capital Dynamics
To derive the individuals human capital accumulation equation, substi-
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+ (Ht) lnHt  
  a(1   ) (ht) (Ht)
exp ( (Ht) lnht lnHt)
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After rearranging, we get equation (9), of Section 3,
ht+1=A 
 (a(1   ))1  (Ht)(+ (Ht) lnHt)+(1 ) (ht)(1 )
exp (( (Ht) (1  ) lnht lnHt)) +  (9)
B Aggregate Human Capital Dynamics
To get the economys human capital accumulation functionHt+1, at t+1,
we simply aggregate (9), i.e.,
Ht+1=A 

















From combining (Ap.1) and (Ap.2), we get
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Ht+1=A ( )
 (a(1   ))1 
(Ht)
(+ (Ht) lnHt)+(1 )+( (Ht) lnHt)(1 ) + 
=A ( ) (a(1   ))1  (Ht)+ (Ht) lnHt + 
We may rewrite the last equation to get equation (10), of Section 3,
Ht+1 = 
(Ht)
+ (Ht) lnHt +  (10)
where

  A ( ) (a(1   ))1  (100)
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